



In the movie II Postino, Mario, an Italian postal worker, encoun-
ters the love of his life at the same time that he becomes acquainted
with the Chilean poet-in-exile Pablo Neruda. The lowly mailman asks
the established poet to teach him how to write love poetry. Neruda
introduces him to the idea of the "metaphor." This idea transforms
the life of the younger man and succeeds in attracting his beloved to
him. The idealistic new poet's life as a family man then triggers
encounters with corrupt local government officials, and eventually leads
to his untimely death at a political demonstration.
The search for the right metaphor for the Internet occupies some
of the "best minds of my generation."' And as with the protagonist
in II Postino, academics' search for the "killer-app"2 metaphor is
intertwined with their attitudes toward government. The themes of
metaphor and government underlie the otherwise disparate methodolo-
gies and conclusions generated in the Internet Symposium articles.3
The various authors could be categorized according to their preferred
metaphors, but I prefer to categorize them by their attitudes toward
governmental involvement in regulation of the Internet. Three see
government as a necessary evil, two others view it as necessary and
good, and two more approach it as sufficient but not necessary.
Ninth Circuit Judge Alex Kozinski, who holds the perhaps
oxymoronic status of a libertarian judge, expresses his skepticism about
the search for a metaphor by rearranging the letters of "information
* Associate Professor, Seattle University School of Law.
1. Allen Ginsburg, Howl, in HOWL AND OTHER POEMS (1956).
2. Killer application, that is, a terrific software package.
3. The Articles are based on a live symposium held at Seattle University in September 1996.
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superhighway" to spell "enormous hairy pig with fan." In tweaking
the over-used metaphor of the infobahn, he leads into the observation
that metaphors "tend to hide what the real issues are." What are some
of those issues for him? "[T]here's some really pretty extreme things
in here. Do we really mean that communications on the airways can't
be controlled at all? For example, how about blackmail? How about
espionage? How about child pornography? Are you in favor of being
able to download snuff flicks?" With these questions, Judge Kozinski
expresses not only his impatience at the metatranscendent solutions
that the right metaphor will supposedly work upon specific legal
problems, but also a skepticism about what I term the cyberlibertarian
perspective. He is suggesting, astonishingly, that law might provide
rules to govern human activities on the Internet. This suggestion is
startling from someone who might be predicted to embrace the
anarchic, free-wheeling, individualistic qualities of the Internet. The
thought astonishes too because so much of the published legal
discourse on the Internet to date has focused on rules that emanate
from sources other than government-sources such as private
contractual arrangements or even technical specifications-which
regulate behavior on the Internet.4 Judge Kozinski's metaphor of the
hairy pig is somehow a reply to those who argue that legal rules should
always be decentralized. It is tied to an optimism about the ability of
government to manage this new medium in familiar ways, despite his
general distrust of government interference in private matters.
Jonathan Wallace and Michael Green, on the other hand, are
extremely serious about both trusting the power of analogy and
metaphor and mistrusting the power of government. They believe that
a new communication medium quickly gives rise to a new analogy or
metaphor and that a government that works with inadequate models
for the technology is a dangerous government. Underlying their search
for a metaphorical Rosetta Stone is a skepticism about the judiciary's
4. See generally David R. Johnson & David Post, Law and Borders-The Rise of Law in
Cyberspace 48 STAN. L. REV. 1367 (1996); David Post, Anarchy and State on the Internet: An
Essay on law-Making in Cyberspace, 1995 J. ONLINE L. art. 3 (1995) <http://warthog.cc.wm.edu/
law/publications/jol/post.hml>; Robert Dunne, Deterring Unauthorized Access to Computers:
Controlling Behavior in Cyberspace Through a Contract Law Paradigm, 35 JURIMETRICS J. 1 (1994);
Trotter Hardy, The Proper Legal Regime for "Cyberspace", 55 PITTSBURGH L. REV. 993 (1994);
A. Michael Froornkin, The Internet as a Source of Regulatory Arbitrage, in BORDERS IN
CYBERSPACE 129 (1997) (also found at <http://www.law.miami.edu/--froomkin/artides/
arbitr.htm>). But see Keith Aoki, (Intellectual) Property and Sovereignty: Notes Toward a Cultural
Geography of Authorship, 48 STAN. L. REV. 1293 (1996); Julie E. Cohen, The Right to Read
Anonymously: A Closer Look at Copyright Management, 28 CONN. L. REV. 981 (1996); Lawrence
Lessig, The Zones of Cyberspace, 48 STAN. L. REV. 1403 (1996).
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ability to fashion a coherent First Amendment law. Along the way,
they also express some doubt about government's role in regulating
speech, a doubt that is of course embedded in the language of the First
Amendment itself. The authors note that medium-specific First
Amendment doctrine, which "examines the underlying technology of
the communication to find 'the proper fit between First Amendment
values and competing interests,"'" has resulted in a patchwork of
rationales unsatisfying to those who value either consistency or a broad
ambit of free speech.
While the Internet as a medium of communication can be
analogized to many existing forms of communication, it may arguably
be so unique as to justify protection even broader than that accorded
to print. Wallace and Green therefore propose that the Internet should
be likened to a printing press or virtual town hall for First Amendment
purposes. Despite their opposite approaches to the question of
metaphor, I place Wallace and Green with Judge Kozinski in the camp
of those who accept government as a necessary evil in Internet
lawmaking.
By contrast, two other authors display what I call a necessary-and-
good approach toward government and the Internet. George Chen
describes a comprehensive plan of top-down regulation in Taiwan so
as to implement its NII initiative. The government's role seems
unquestioned as well as pervasive. For example, Chen describes a
recent court decision involving copyrighted material downloaded from
the Internet to make a CD-Rom compilation, which was then offered
by the defendant as a free gift to accompany his magazine. Despite
raising a fair-use defense that was premised on the nature of the
Internet as facilitating the circulation of information, the defendant was
found guilty and sentenced to seven months imprisonment (suspended
for three years). 6 Such a harsh punishment for copyright violations is
almost unthinkable in the United States, and recent efforts to crimi-
nalize activities that might be permissible under the current 1976
Copyright Act are being strongly resisted.7 Chen does not engage in
metaphor-fitting, but he does analyze how the Internet may or may not
fit under existing definitions of broadcast media or publications that
are currently regulated in Taiwan.
5. ACLU v. Reno, 929 F. Supp. 824, 873 (E.D. Pa. 1996).
6. See Taiwan v. Chun-I Hwang, 84 Su-Tse No. 2341 (July 26, 1996).
7. See U.S. v. LaMacchia, 871 F. Supp. 535 (D. Mass. 1994); H.R. 2441, 104th Cong., 1st
Session (1995).
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Robert Cumbow, too, strongly believes that government does have
an unquestioned role to play in applying copyright law to the Internet.
Like Judge Kozinski, but unlike Wallace and Green, he engages in
severe metaphor deconstruction while remaining unperturbed by the
possible high-handedness of government intervention. Despite his
skepticism about metaphors, he reaches the same conclusion as Wallace
and Green do with their quest to compare the Internet to an existing
medium of communication: that "Internet communication is, quite
simply, a print medium." This allows him to conclude that copyright
law applies to the Internet as easily as it did to any other print media
in the past.' The interesting result is that a "print" model may
encourage freer expression under the first amendment, but simulta-
neously may inhibit expression under copyright law because digital
documents then become subject to control by the private author in a
way that government cannot replicate.
The final two authors follow the logic of those who would transfer
some rule-making authority from the government to third party
Internet Service Providers (ISPs)'°-or what I term the sufficient but
not necessary approach to governmental regulation of the Internet.
Kelly Kunsch pays attention to the culture of Internet users who will
resist top-down legal regulation. Nonetheless, he, like the other
contributors in this volume believes that law has a role to play in
setting rules for the road. From Kunsch's perspective as a law
librarian, there is a pressing need to ensure authenticity and integrity
of documents disseminated on the Internet regardless of whether those
documents are disseminated publicly by the private sector or the
traditional "public" sector of government. The private system of
regulation that he proposes rests heavily on verification of primary
domain names by local domain owners. By "making registered domain
owners legally responsible for their sites, market or liability factors
insure integrity of the site. This includes not only the duty to secure
the site, but also that of discovering tampering on the site." Thus
Kunsch proposes that domain owners serve as the point of legal
8. But see Jessica Litman, The Exclusive Right to Read, 13 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L. J.
29 (1994); Pamela Samuelson, The Copyright Grab, WIRED 4.01, January 1996 (also found at
<http://sunsite.unc.edu/negativland/white.htm>).
9. The Church of Scientology has demonstrated this principle in both print and electronic
media. See, e.g., Religious Technology Center v. Netcom On-Line Communication Services,
Inc., 907 F. Supp. 131 (N.D. Ca. 1995); Religious Technology Center v. Lerma 1996 WL
633131 (E.D. Va. Oct. 4, 1996).
10. For convenience, I will refer to any entity that provides access or content to the Internet




regulation, relying on private legal remedies such as breach of warranty
or negligence to encourage authentication of documents posted on the
site. His solution is in line with those cyberlibertarians who believe
that private ordering through contract is the most natural form of legal
regulation on the Internet.
Neal Friedman and Kevin Siebert discuss the efficacy of the
private ordering imagined by Kunsch and others, through the specific
and concrete example of domain name registration. They find this
private system of legal regulation highly wanting. Newly emerging
intellectual property interests in domain names, which have become
extremely valuable commercially in an extremely short amount of time,
are being assigned by a government contractor that has little public
accountability-Network Solutions, Inc. (NSI). As problematic as this
privatization of entitlement distribution is the shifting positions that
NSI has vis-A-vis its assignment of entitlements. Trademark disputes
over domain name assignments have exploded in the past year. When
NSI's policy was to put a domain name on "hold" based on a mere
allegation of trademark infringement, it was criticized. When it
changed its policy so that it did not put the domain name on hold
pending outcome of the lawsuit, it was further criticized.
The proposal on the table now would take any domain name
registrar out of the dispute resolution business." Whatever the final
resolution of these policy shifts, the domain name controversy tells us
that nongovernmental third parties who function as legal rule-makers
or rule-enforcers can be just as problematic, if not more so, than the
government they are intended to supplant. NSI's policies have resulted
in extra-judicial "private" injunctions; they have been implemented
without any public notice and comment period; and they have not
satisfied their "customers"-the users who allegedly detest governmen-
tal regulation of the Internet. Yet proposals abound to place upon
private ISPs analogous legal responsibilities of policing obscenity,
copyright infringement, and defamation. 2 Vicarious liability theories
have become a staple feature of Internet law reform, placing the
11. See Robert Shaw, Internet Domain Names: Whose Domain Is This? (visited April 25,
1997) <http://www.itu.int/intreg/dns.html>.
12. See, e.g., ACLU v. Reno, 929 F. Supp. 824 (E.D. Pa. 1996) (discussing safe harbor
provisions for transmission of indecent materials); Information Infrastructure Task Force,
Intellectual Property and the National Information Infrastructure: The Report of the Working
Group on Intellectual Property Rights (September 1995) (discussing ISP liability for copyright
infringement); Stratton Oakmont v. Prodigy, 1995 WL 323710 (NY Sup. Ct. May 24, 1995)
(discussing ISP liability for delivery of defamatory material). But see Niva Elkin-Koren, Copyright
and Social Dialogue on the Information Superhighway: The Case Against Copyright Liability of
Bulletin Board Operators, 13 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L. J. 345 (1995).
19971
618 Seattle University Law Review [Vol. 20:613
responsibility for the enforcement of legal norms on technology
providers or third parties to the underlying dispute. ISPs are regarded
as a logical node for the imposition of legal norms that are typically
imposed through private law litigation or public legislation.
What is the state of what some of us have the foolhardiness to
term "Internet Law"? If one year on the Internet is equivalent to
seven human years, then perhaps what we are witnessing is a shift
from first to second generation concerns. Does the public/private
distinction cohere or dissolve in cyberspace? Do rules shift from
domains such as national governments to metadomains such as
international organizations or subdomains such as ISPs? These
Articles-through their implicit or explicit discussion of rule-making
authorities, analogies, and metaphors-suggest that the questions now
are not questions of "whether" but rather questions of "how."
